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DEFENDANTS’  BURDENS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 55: POST-
ANSWER DEFAULTS AND JURISDICTIONAL WAIVERS IN CITY 
OF NEW YORK V. MICKALIS PAWN SHOP 
Gregory A. Kendall* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs default 
judgments.1  This device allows a plaintiff to gain requested relief after a 
defendant has failed to take a required action within a certain 
timeframe.2  Its purposes are to keep dockets current and to prevent 
dilatory defendants from impeding the speedy disposition of plaintiffs’ 
claims.3  The text of the rule provides: “When a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk 
must enter the party’s default.”4  The party seeking relief may then 
apply to the court for default judgment.5  If the court enters default 
judgment, the litigation ends in a decisive victory for the plaintiff 
without regard to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.6 
At a minimum, the threat of default judgment requires defendants to 
respond to the complaint in a timely fashion.  However, Rule 55’s 
language “plead or otherwise defend” is open to interpretation.  Is it 
enough merely to respond to the complaint or file a motion to dismiss?  
Or must a defendant participate in the litigation all the way through to 
the final judgment? The defendant’s burden in each case is vastly 
different.  When only a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss is 
required, a defendant may be able to expend little effort and minimal 
costs in forcing a plaintiff to prove the case on the merits.  In contrast, 
where the defendant must participate fully all the way through to the end 
of trial, the defendant can incur significant costs and burdens associated 
with complex and protracted litigation.  Defendants who have 
meritorious defenses but are forced to withdraw from litigation due to 
 
 * Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review; Executive Editor, 2012-
13. 
 1. FED. R. CIV. P. 55.  All references to “Rule 55” and other rules throughout this Casenote will 
refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted. 
 2. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 232 (2011). 
 3. Id. 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). 
 5. FED. R. CIV . P. 55(b)(2).  Rule 55(b)(1) allows the clerk to enter judgment sua sponte in 
cases where the relief sought is a definite sum of money and where the plaintiff has submitted an 
affidavit showing the amount due. 
 6. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 232 (2011). 
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financial constraints have the most to lose under this approach.  
In May 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in City of New 
York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, highlighted a growing split among 
the federal circuit courts as to exactly what Rule 55 requires of 
defendants.7  The defendant, a pawn shop from South Carolina, 
voluntarily withdrew from litigation almost two years after the filing of 
the complaint, seeking to conserve its limited resources to defend 
pending criminal charges.8  Until then, Mickalis Pawn Shop had 
participated in discovery and filed numerous motions to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).9  In affirming the district 
court’s entry of default judgment, the Second Circuit recognized a 
conflict between its own interpretation of Rule 55 and the interpretation 
embraced by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which do not recognize a 
“post-answer default” under Rule 55.10 
This casenote analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in Mickalis 
Pawn Shop.  Part II provides a background on entry of default and 
default judgments under Rule 55.  Part III analyzes the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in Mickalis Pawn Shop.  Part IV critiques the Second Circuit’s 
application of the majority rule, arguing that application of the minority 
rule under the circumstances of the case is more consistent with the 
plain language, policy rationales, and history of Rule 55.  Finally, Part V 
concludes by suggesting that the Second Circuit should have applied the 
minority rule’s narrower interpretation and declined to enter default 
judgment against Mickalis Pawn Shop. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Default Judgments Under Rule 55 
Rule 55 establishes a two-part process by which a plaintiff can seek 
default judgment.  Rule 55(a) directs the clerk of court to enter a default 
against a defendant who has “failed to plead or otherwise defend” when 
 
 7. 645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 8. Id. at 122. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 31.  This Casenote will use the phrase “post-answer default” to refer to defaults that 
occur after the defendant has answered the complaint, as discussed in further detail below.  For the sake 
of simplicity, the Casenote will refer to defendants’ burdens under Rule 55, although recognizing that in 
rare cases plaintiffs may also be held in default for failure to plead or otherwise defend against a 
defendant’s counterclaim.  See, e.g., Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam).  Although the provisions of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), which provides for default judgment as a 
sanction for failure to comply with the discovery rules, could also be considered a form of post-answer 
default, this note will limit the discussion of post-answer default to the defendant’s failure to plead or 
otherwise defend in the Rule 55 context. 
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that failure is shown “by affidavit or otherwise.”11  Default constitutes 
an admission of liability, but not of damages.12  The court may set aside 
a default “for good cause.”13 
After the clerk has entered default, the party seeking relief must apply 
to the court for a default judgment.14  The party against whom default 
judgment is sought must be served with written notice of the application 
at least seven days before the hearing if that party has appeared 
personally or by a representative.15  At its discretion, the court may hold 
hearings to conduct an accounting, determine the amount of damages, 
establish the truth of allegations by evidence, or investigate other 
matters.16  The court may then enter default judgment against the 
defaulting party.17  The entry of default judgment converts this 
admission of liability into a final judgment, ending the litigation and 
awarding the plaintiff the damages to which the court decides the 
plaintiff is entitled.18 
A defendant against whom a default judgment is entered may make a 
motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b).19  When deciding 
whether to relieve a party from default judgment under Rule 60(b), 
district courts ask: (1) whether the default was willful, (2) whether the 
defendant demonstrates the existence of a meritorious defense, and (3) 
whether, and to what extent, vacating the default will cause the non-
defaulting party prejudice.20  Alternatively, the defendant may appeal 
 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). 
 12. See Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 128. 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c). 
 14. FED. R. CIV . P. 55(b)(2).  In limited situations, Rule 55(b)(1) requires the clerk to enter 
judgment sua sponte in cases where the relief sought is a definite sum of money and where the plaintiff 
has submitted an affidavit showing the amount due.  However, this subsection applies “against a 
defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing.”  Id. (emphasis added.) 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2)(A)–(D). 
 17. FED. R. CIV . P. 55(b)(2).  Various sources emphasize that default judgment is entirely at the 
discretion of the district court; it is not an entitlement for the plaintiff.  See, e.g., Mason v. Lister, 562 
F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he entry of default judgment is committed to the discretion of the 
district judge.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &  ARTHUR R. M ILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2685 (3d ed. 2011) (“[It is] clear that the party making the request is not entitled to a default judgment 
as of right.”).  The court’s discretion to choose not to enter default judgment is justified by the “drastic 
nature of a default.”  46 AM. JUR 2D Judgments § 236 (2011). 
 18. See Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 128.  FED. R. CIV . P. 54(c) limits the court’s discretion 
in awarding damages—damages may not exceed the amount sought in the complaint, nor be of a 
different type. 
 19. Rule 60(b) lists the grounds upon which a court may relieve a party from final judgment.  
These include excusable neglect, voidness, or “any other reason that justifies relief.”  FED. R. CIV . P. 
60(b). 
 20. S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 2010).  For examples of tests used by other 
circuits, see Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[A] 
court should consider three factors: (1) whether the non-defaulting party will be prejudiced; (2) whether 
3
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directly from the default judgment.21 
Default judgment is “the most severe sanction which the court may 
apply.”22  Its main purposes are to enforce deadlines and to prevent 
dilatory defendants from inhibiting the speedy disposition of claims.23  
In determining whether default judgment is appropriate, courts balance a 
variety of factors, including: (1) the extent of the party’s personal 
responsibility, (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to 
meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery, (3) a history of 
dilatoriness, (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was 
willful or in bad faith, (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than 
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions, and (6) 
whether the claim or defense is meritorious.24 
As a sanction, default judgment is quite powerful, reducing the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof on the merits of the claim to a mere formality.  
Although Rule 55 grants the court discretion to determine the factual 
basis for the plaintiff’s claims and requested damages, ultimately the 
plaintiff is excused from the same burdens of production and persuasion 
that are required to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, defeat summary 
judgment, and win a case in front of a trier of fact.25  In light of the 
 
the defaulting party has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether culpable conduct of the defaulting party 
led to the default.”); Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1995) (moving party must show (1) 
“good cause” for the default; (2) quick action to correct the default; and (3) the existence of a 
meritorious defense).  In I  re Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit recognized 
additional factors, including the public interest, the financial loss to the defendant, and whether the 
defendant acted quickly to correct the default.  Noting a circuit split over the factors to be considered, 
the court explained that the fundamental purpose of the test is to identify circumstances warranting 
“good cause” to set aside a default, “informed by equitable principles.”  Id. 
 21. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 128.  The court describes direct appeals from default 
judgment as permissible but unusual.  An appeals court reviewing a denial of a defendant’s Rule 60(b) 
motion asks whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment.  When the 
defendant appeals directly from default judgment, the appeals court analyzes whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in granting the default judgment in the first place.  Id. 
 22. Id. at 129; see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 235 (2011) (“The entry of a default 
judgment against a party litigant is a harsh and drastic action, invoked only in extreme situations.”); H.F. 
Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[D]efault 
judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted 
because of an essentially unresponsive party.”).  Livermore suggests that deterring intentional delay by 
defendants is a primary purpose of the threat of default: “the possibility of a default is a deterrent to 
those parties who choose delay as part of their litigative strategy.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 23. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 232 (2011).  For additional use of default judgment as a 
sanction, see FED. R. CIV . P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), which also makes default judgments available when a 
party disobeys a discovery order, or fails to attend its own deposition, answer interrogatories, or respond 
to requests for inspection.  See, e.g., Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 
1992). 
 24. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 25. 46 AM JUR. 2d Judgments § 232 (2011) (“A default judgment is entered without regard to the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”).  FED. R. CIV . P. 55(d) establishes the burden of proof for a plaintiff 
who sues the United States government—in such cases, the plaintiff may obtain default judgment only 
“if the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.”  The deliberate 
4
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federal courts’ preference for resolving disputes on the merits,26 default 
judgment is a windfall to plaintiffs and a serious detriment to 
defendants.  Due to the harshness with which the rule operates, 
defendants have an interest in the certainty of the rule’s interpretation 
and application. 
B. How the Courts of Appeals Have Interpreted and Applied Rule 55 
The federal circuit courts have adopted different interpretations of 
Rule 55’s exhortation to “plead or otherwise defend.” Some circuits 
interpret this phrase narrowly, requiring the defendant to make attacks 
only on service of process or to file responsive pleadings.27  As long as 
the defendant answers the complaint, the defendant is not in default, and 
the plaintiff must prove its case on the merits before judgment can be 
entered for the plaintiff.  Other circuits require much more from the 
defendant, recognizing a post-answer default whereby the defendant 
cannot escape default merely by answering the complaint.  These courts 
hold that a defendant who withdraws from the suit at any point has 
defaulted, and the plaintiff can then win a default judgment without 
having to prove its case on the merits.  
1. The Broad Interpretation of “Plead or Otherwise Defend”: The 
Majority Approach 
Among the most common acts leading to post-answer default is 
failure to appear at trial.  In Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & 
Hertell v. Medfit Int’l, Inc.,28 the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
default judgment against a defendant who failed to appear at trial.  The 
plaintiff, a law firm, sued the defendant to recover unpaid legal fees.  
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service of 
process and other Rule 12 defenses, and filed cross-claims and 
counterclaims.29  The defendant failed to appear at the pretrial settlement 
conference.  A few days before trial, the defendant informed the court it 
would not appear for trial, but did not request a continuance or provide 
 
omission of this language from Rule 55(b) suggests an extremely low burden of proof for plaintiffs 
suing private defendants. 
 26. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 129; see also Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 
(10th Cir.1970) (“The preferred disposition of any case is upon its merits and not by default 
judgment.”); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 235 (2011) (“Default judgments are not favored . . . [r]ather, 
courts generally favor the disposition of litigation on the merits rather than by default judgments.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Bass v. Hoaglund, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949). 
 28. Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell v. Medfit Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d 686, 688 
(1st Cir. 1991). 
 29. Id. at 688. 
5
Kendall: Defendants’ Burdens Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55: Post-Answer Default
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1084 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
an excuse.30  The court found the defendant in default when it failed to 
appear at trial.31  After a bench trial on the question of damages, the 
court entered default judgment.32  The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the entry of default judgment.  It found that failure to appear at 
trial constituted a default, and that the plaintiff was not required to prove 
its case because “an entry of default against a defendant establishes the 
defendant’s liability.”33 
Failure to respond to discovery or file pretrial memoranda can also 
lead to post-answer default.  In Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 
the defendants failed to respond to discovery requests for witness lists 
and documents, and failed to file a pretrial memorandum as required by 
court order.34  The defendants justified their actions by explaining that 
they were preoccupied with a bankruptcy proceeding in another court.35  
On the morning the trial was to begin, an attorney notified the court that 
he would be willing to enter an appearance on behalf of the defendants 
if a postponement were granted, telling the court that the main defendant 
was presently attending the bankruptcy proceeding.36  The judge called 
the bankruptcy court, which informed him that the defendant had not 
been attending all of the sessions in the bankruptcy proceeding.37  The 
court held the defendants in default and entered default judgment after a 
hearing to determine damages.38  On appeal, the defendants argued that 
they could not be held in default because they had filed an answer and 
actively participated in discovery.39  The Third Circuit stated that “the 
‘or otherwise defend’ clause is broader than the mere failure to plead.”40  
It explained that a defendant could be subject to default judgment for 
failing to appear at trial or meet other time schedules, as both these acts 
impede the progress of a case.41 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Goldman, 982 F.2d at 693; see also City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 
F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The entry of default, while establishing liability, is not an admission of 
damages.”). 
 34. 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 35. Id. at 916–17. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 917. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  The Third Circuit’s test for determining whether a defendant should be held in default 
asks (1) whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced by the defendant’s conduct, (2) whether the defendant 
has a litigable defense, and (3) whether there is evidence of bad faith or dilatory motive.  See 
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000); Yadav v. Surtees, 87 Fed. App’x 271 (3d 
Cir. 2004); Limehouse v. Delaware, 144 Fed. App’x 921 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 41. Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 918. 
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Intentional, bad-faith conduct can frequently lead to a post-answer 
default as well.  In Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, the parties agreed 
to dismiss the suit without prejudice.42  In the consent agreement, the 
defendants agreed to submit to the court’s jurisdiction and appoint an 
agent to accept service of process if the suit were re-filed within 180 
days.43  The plaintiff re-filed, and the defendants’ attorney filed 
responsive pleadings in a timely fashion.44  However, after the attorney 
had problems contacting the individual defendants at their new 
addresses, the attorney moved to withdraw as counsel.45  The district 
court issued an order to show cause why the defendants should not be 
held in default, and the order was served at the defendants’ last known 
addresses.46  Neither the defendants nor their attorney appeared at the 
show-cause hearing, and the court granted the attorney’s motion to 
withdraw.47  The court held the defendants to be in default, conducted a 
hearing to determine damages, and granted default judgment.48  The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the default judgment, finding that the defendants 
intentionally made themselves unavailable in the time between the 
original dismissal and the default judgment.49  The court also found that 
the defendants failed to “otherwise defend” the action by not appearing 
at the show-cause hearing and by failing to respond to the trial court’s 
certified notices.50 
When the defendant is a corporation, another frequent cause of post-
answer default is the withdrawal of counsel, followed by the party’s 
failure to obtain substitute counsel.51  In Fingerhut Corp. v. Ackra 
Direct Mktg. Corp., the plaintiffs brought suit for breaches of contract 
and warranty.52  The defendants delayed discovery over a two-year 
period by submitting late or non-responsive discovery answers or by 
 
 42. Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 129. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 133. 
 51. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) permits parties to proceed pro se, the widely accepted 
interpretation of the statute holds that it does not apply to corporations.  See, e.g., Nat’l Indep. Theater 
Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748 F.2d 602, 609 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[C]orporations must 
always be represented by legal counsel.”).  The separate legal existence of a corporation prevents its 
directors, officers or other agents from acting pro se on the corporation’s behalf.  Id.  Thus, failure to 
obtain substitute counsel following an attorney’s withdrawal from representation can form the basis for 
a finding of default against a corporation. 
 52. Fingerhut Corp. v. Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 854 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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failing to produce requests entirely.53  The defendants’ counsel then 
moved to withdraw from representation, citing conflict of interest and 
defendants’ failure to pay legal fees.54  Defendants did not obtain 
substitute counsel and failed to produce any further discovery requests.55  
After the plaintiffs moved for default judgment, defendants filed 
affidavits opposing the motion and requesting a sixty-day continuance to 
obtain new counsel due to financial difficulties and pending lawsuits in 
a different state.56  The court entered default judgment.  The Eight 
Circuit affirmed the default judgment, explaining that default judgment 
is appropriate for “willful violations of court rules, contumacious 
conduct or intentional delays.”57  The court found that defendants’ 
failure to comply with discovery orders, attend pretrial conferences, and 
obtain substitute counsel met this standard.58 
Thus, the circuit courts that recognize post-answer defaults consider a 
wide range of conduct when deciding whether to impose default 
judgment.  This conduct can include failure to respond to discovery 
requests, failure to file pretrial memoranda, failure to appear at pretrial 
conferences or trial, and failure to obtain substitute counsel.  These 
cases suggest that conduct objectively demonstrating a lack of interest in 
participating or defending the suit can give rise to default after the 
complaint has been answered.  Under this broad interpretation of Rule 
55, the defendant must both answer the complaint nd continue to 
participate fully to the end of the litigation, or else be held in default.  
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 855. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  The court also explained that the existence of a meritorious defense is not sufficient to 
avoid default judgment when the defendant has engaged in willful misconduct.  I . at 856–57. 
 58. Id.  The Ninth Circuit similarly found default judgment proper against a plaintiff for the 
plaintiff’s failure to defend against a counterclaim, when the plaintiff repeatedly failed to attend pretrial 
conferences, or “otherwise participate in or remain informed about the litigation after its counsel 
withdrew.  Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).  This case 
places the Ninth Circuit in company with those circuits who follow the majority rule in recognizing 
post-answer defaults.  But see Pangelinan v. Wiseman, 370 Fed. App’x 818 (9th Cir. 2010).  In 
Pangelinan, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court properly denied a plaintiff’s request for entry 
of default against federal agents in a Bivens action because the defendants had filed timely motions to 
dismiss.  The court then cited directly to the phrase “plead or otherwise defend” without distinguishing 
the case from Ringgold and other Ninth Circuit cases interpreting Rule 55(a).  SeeBeatty v. Warner, 198 
Fed. App’x 584 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiff’s motion for default judgment because the defendants timely answered or filed responsive 
pleadings). 
8
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2. The Narrow Interpretation of “Plead or Otherwise Defend”: The 
Minority Approach 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Bass v. Hoaglund is 
the leading case for the minority approach, which interprets Rule 55 
much more narrowly.59  Bass, a Texas resident, was sued in Kansas by a 
Kansas citizen for personal injuries.60  Bass appeared by counsel and 
filed an answer.  Bass’s counsel then withdrew from the case, but did 
not withdraw the appearance or answer.61  Bass claimed he was never 
notified of his attorney’s withdrawal.62  When the case went to trial, 
Bass never appeared, and plaintiff’s counsel was the only person 
present.63  The trial court found Bass in default and entered judgment for 
the plaintiff in the amount sought in the complaint.64  Bass did not know 
about these proceedings until months later.65 
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Bass argued that he had been deprived 
of his right to a jury trial in violation of the Seventh Amendment.66  The 
Fifth Circuit agreed, explaining that while there is no right to a jury trial 
when a default occurs, Bass had not defaulted, because he had made an 
appearance and filed pleadings that were never withdrawn.67  Analyzing 
Rule 55, the court explained that “otherwise defend” means that the 
defendant is not required to have a lawyer or be present when the case is 
called for trial.68  It stated, “The words ‘otherwise defend’ refer to 
attacks on the service, or motions to dismiss, or for better particulars, 
and the like, which may prevent default without presently pleading to 
the merits.”69  As a result, Bass was immune from default judgment 
when his attorney filed an answer—the failure to appear for trial did not 
result in default.70  In such a situation, the plaintiff is required to prove 
his case.71  The court found that Bass was entitled to notice of the 
default under Rule 55(b).72  As Bass had no reason to think he was in 
default, did not know his counsel had withdrawn, and had no notice of 
 
 59. 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949). 
 60. Id. at 207. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 208. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 208–09 (explaining that the withdrawal by Bass’ counsel did not constitute a 
withdrawal by Bass himself, or a withdrawal of his pleadings). 
 68. Id. at 210. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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the pending default judgment, “to get such a judgment without 
evidence” was a violation of due process.73 
In Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Systems, the 
Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion.74  Solaroll brought a 
trademark infringement suit against Bio-Energy, and the parties later 
settled.75  Solaroll then filed a motion to reinstate the action, claiming 
that Bio-Energy had violated the settlement agreement.76  Bio-Energy’s 
counsel received copies of the motion and promised Solaroll’s counsel 
to forward a proposed stipulation and motion for extension of time.77  
However, Bio-Energy never communicated with Solaroll or responded 
to the motion to reinstate.78  As a result, the trial court granted Solaroll’s 
reinstatement motion unopposed.79  Bio-Energy filed a motion to vacate 
this order under Rule 60(b), arguing in part that the district court failed 
to comply with the notice and hearing provisions of Rule 55.80  The 
district court denied the motion. 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  It stated that the district 
court was not required to comply with Rule 55, because by definition its 
reinstatement order could not have been a default judgment.81  I  
explained that default judgment can be entered against a defendant who 
fails to appear or answer a complaint, because “in such circumstances 
the case never has been placed at issue.”82  However, “if the defendant 
has answered the complaint but fails to appear at trial, issue has been 
joined, and the court cannot enter a default judgment.”83  In such 
circumstances, the court may proceed to trial without the defendant, and 
 
 73. Id.  The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Bass in Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 
1981), where the district court entered default judgment against the defendants for failure to appear at 
trial.  Quoting Bass, the court explained that Rule 55 “does not require that to escape default the 
defendant must not only file a sufficient answer to the merits, but must also have a lawyer or be present 
in court when the case is called for trial.”  Seven Elves, Inc., 635 F.2d at 401, n.2.  For examples of state 
courts that have followed or endorsed the Bass rule in interpreting local default judgment rules, see 
Coulas v. Smith, 395 P.2d 527, 529 (Ariz. 1964); Rombough v. Mitchell, 140 P.3d 202, 205 (Colo. App. 
2006); Klein v. Rappaport, 90 A.2d 834, 835 (D.C. 1952); Sharp v. Sharp, 409 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Kan. 
1966); Black v. Rimmer, 700 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Minn. App. 2005); Hous. Found., Inc. v. Beagle, 957 
A.2d 405 (Vt. 2008). 
 74. 803 F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 75. Id. at 1131. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1133.  Those provisions require that a party that has appeared personally or by 
representative be served written notice of the application for default judgment at least seven days before 
the hearing.  FED. R. CIV . P. 55(b)(2). 
 81. Solaroll, 803 F.2d at 1134. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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the plaintiff can win a favorable judgment only if the plaintiff proves its 
case.84  The court found that Bio-Energy had met its burden in the 
pleading stage, and the issue had been joined.85  Thus, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that the lower court’s order could not have been a default 
judgment, and therefore the reinstatement order could not be vacated 
under Rule 60(b).86 
III.  CITY OF NEW YORK V. MICKALIS PAWN SHOP 
The May 2011 decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC presents a post-answer 
default situation within the context of a defendant’s challenge to 
personal jurisdiction.  By finding that the defendants waived their right 
to challenge personal jurisdiction on direct appeal, by virtue of 
appearing and then defaulting, the Second Circuit illustrates the far-
reaching effects of post-answer default on waiver of jurisdictional 
defenses, and demonstrates the powerful consequences that follow when 
courts apply the majority interpretation of “plead or othwerwise 
defend.” 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In May 2006, the City of New York brought suit in the Southern 
District of New York against fifteen licensed firearms dealers operating 
in Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia.87  The 
City’s complaint alleged, inter alia, public nuisance, and sought 
injunctive relief.88  It claimed that the dealers’ sales practices facilitated 
illegal purchases of firearms, which then traveled through interstate 
commerce and were used to commit crimes in New York City.89  
Defendants Mickalis Pawn Shop and Adventure Outdoors operated 
single retails store in South Carolina and Georgia, respectively, from 
which they made only in-person sales.90 
Four defendants, including Mickalis Pawn Shop and Adventure 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  In addition, Bio-Energy’s pleadings were still in effect at the time, and Solaroll never 
moved to strike Bio-Energy’s pleadings. 
 86. Id. at 1135. 
 87. City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 119.  Adventure Outdoors also operated websites allowing customers from out-of-state 
to place deposits on firearms.  However, customers using this method were required to visit the store in 
person to complete the sale and obtain the firearm.  The store had never sold a firearm to a New York 
resident through this method.  Id. at 119–20. 
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Outdoors, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(2).91  These motions asserted that the requirements of New York’s 
long-arm statute were not satisfied, that the defendants lacked minimum 
contacts with New York, and that they had never purposefully availed 
themselves of interstate commerce so as reasonably to foresee defending 
a lawsuit in New York.92  These motions were all denied on the basis 
that the City had made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction; 
the final determination of personal jurisdiction was to be made at trial.93  
The court characterized the application of the New York long-arm 
statute to public-nuisance suits against nonresident firearms dealers as 
“a case of first impression.”94  The defendants’ motion for leave to take 
interlocutory appeal was denied.95  New York City amended its 
complaint to allege only two causes of action, public and statutory 
nuisance, and sought only injunctive relief.96  The defendants made 
additional 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss, which were also denied.97 
During the discovery phase of litigation in February 2008, almost 
twenty-one months after the complaint was filed, Mickalis Pawn Shop’s 
owner Larry Mickalis was indicted by a federal grand jury in South 
Carolina for knowingly selling firearms to convicted felons.98  
Mickalis’s motions to stay the litigation, pending resolution of the 
criminal case, were denied.99  A week later, the three law firms 
representing Mickalis Pawn Shop moved to withdraw as counsel.100  
They explained that Mickalis wanted to concentrate his financial 
resources on defending the criminal charges.101  However, the firms 
 
 91. Id. at 120–21. 
 92. Id.  The New York long-arm statute, in relevant part, provides: “A court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or 
through an agent . . . (1) Transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods 
or services in the state; or . . . (3) commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or 
property within the state . . . if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the 
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . . .”  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 
(McKinney 2008). 
 93. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 118.  The trial court’s order denying the motions stated that 
the City had demonstrated that the defendants knew that their reliance on interstate commerce would 
cause handguns to end up in New York City where they would be used by criminals to “terrorize 
significant portions of the city’s population,” which provided the requisite minimum contacts to satisfy 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii).  Id. 
 94. Id. at 121. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  The indictment was for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006).  Id. 
 99. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 122. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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specified that they were not waiving their personal jurisdiction defense 
and would continue to raise it.102 
At a status conference in March, Mickalis confirmed his consent to 
his attorneys’ withdrawal, and his attorneys also announced that 
Mickalis did not intend to defend the case further.103  The court warned 
Mickalis that default would likely follow if he did not intend to defend 
the case further; Mickalis responded that he was aware of the 
consequences, but did not expressly consent to entry of default.104  A 
week later, the magistrate judge granted the attorneys’ motions for 
withdrawal, and after a formal request from the City, entered default 
against Mickalis Pawn Shop.105  In June 2008, the City moved for 
default judgment, and the district court granted the motion, adopting the 
City’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own.106  
The court entered default judgment in March 2009 in the form of a 
permanent injunction.107 
Adventure Outdoors proceeded through the close of discovery, and 
then moved for summary judgment based on lack of personal 
jurisdiction and preemption of the City’s cause of action by the 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).108  This motion 
was denied, and the trial court determined that it would proceed to a 
bench trial with an advisory jury.109  During jury selection, Adventure 
Outdoors’s counsel moved to withdraw from the case, referring to 
limited financial resources and the fact that it would not likely win in a 
bench trial.110  The court denied the motions to withdraw because the 
trial was already underway.111  The court advised counsel that refusal to 
proceed with jury selection and other proceedings would likely lead to 
default.112  Adventure Outdoors’s counsel confirmed that its client 
refused to go forward, but refused to give express consent to default.113  
The court noted Adventure Outdoors’s default, and entered default 
judgment on the same day as the default judgment against Mickalis 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 123. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  The injunction provided for the appointment of a special master and remedial measures 
to abate the public nuisance caused by Mickalis’ activities. 
 108. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006). 
 109. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 124. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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Pawn Shop, over Adventure Outdoors’s objections.114 
Mickalis Pawn Shop and Adventure Outdoors appealed directly from 
the judgment, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by 
finding them in default by virtue of their withdrawal from the 
litigation.115  Because they appeared in the litigation over several years 
and repeatedly moved to dismiss, filed answers, and “vigorously” 
defended in discovery, the defendants argued that they did not “fail[ ] to 
plead or otherwise defend” as Rule 55(a) requires.116  They argued that, 
because Rule 55(a) was inapplicable, the City was required to prove its 
case on the merits by a preponderance of the evidence, including proof 
that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the 
state’s long-arm statute and that its claim was not preempted by the 
PLCAA.117  Thus, the defendants challenged the default judgment under 
Rule 55(b) on three grounds.  First, “procedural irregularities” prevented 
them from receiving proper notice of the Rule 55 proceedings.  Second, 
the trial court failed to make a finding by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants.  Third, the 
City’s claims were preempted by the federal statute.118 
B. Opinion 
In its discussion of the entry of default under Rule 55(a), the court 
noted that the case did not present a “typical” Rule 55 scenario where a 
defendant defaults by failing to file a timely answer.119  Regardless, a 
district court may enter default against a defendant who has failed to 
 
 114. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 124. 
 115. Id at 128–29.  Although the typical method of contesting a default judgment is by motion for 
relief from judgment or order under Rule 60(b), direct appeal from a default judgment is permissible.  
Rule 60(b) allows relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding under a variety of circumstances.  
The trial court’s denial of the motion is then evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard on appeal.  
As the Second Circuit explained in Mickalis Pawn Shop, the issue on direct appeal from a default 
judgment is whether the trial court abused its discretion in entering default or default judgment in the 
first place.  Id. at 128. 
 116. Id. at 128.  The court agreed with Mickalis Pawn that it had “‘‘appeared and defended 
vigorously’ over the course of ‘about two years of active litigation.’”  Id. at 139–40. 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2006).  The court found that both the defendants had waived their 
preemption arguments by not raising them on appeal.  Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 137. 
 118. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 131.  In its argument regarding procedural irregularities, 
Mickalis Pawn argued that the Rule 55 proceedings were inconsistent with due process because it was 
no longer able to receive automatic notification of docket activity through the electronic case filing 
system after its counsel withdrew.  In its opinion, the court responded that Mickalis Pawn actually 
participated in the Rule 55 proceedings regardless of its inability to receive automatic updates on docket 
activity.  Therefore, the default judgment did not result from “a series of ex parte acts” (as Mickalis 
Pawn described it), and Mickalis Pawn had an adequate opportunity to be heard.  Id. t 132. 
 119. Id. at 129. 
14
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“otherwise defend.”120  The court explained that it has embraced a 
“broad understanding” of the phrase “otherwise defend,” which gives 
broad discretion to trial judges, to use default judgment to ensure “the 
orderly and expeditious conduct of litigation” by imposing default after 
the trial has begun.121  Thus, entry of default is an appropriate response 
to a defendant’s “obstructionist litigation tactics.”122 
The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
entering default against either Mickalis Pawn or Adventure Outdoors.  It 
found that the defendants had affirmatively expressed their intent to 
discontinue their participation in the lawsuit, even after they had been 
warned that default would likely result.123  According to the court, entry 
of default was also proper because Mickalis Pawn had not obtained 
substitute counsel after its attorneys withdrew.124  The court summarily 
rejected the defendants’ arguments in reliance on Bass.  Without 
addressing the merits of that decision, the Second Circuit merely stated, 
“[ Bass’s] interpretation of Rule 55 has not been embraced by this 
court . . . nor has it found favor in a majority of our sister circuits.”125 
The court addressed the defendants’ arguments that the district court 
was required to find that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the district court’s failure 
to do so constituted a per se abuse of discretion.126  The Second Circuit 
declined to respond definitively to this argument, citing its own 
precedent which held that a district court “may first assure itself that it 
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant” before granting a motion 
for default judgment.127  Emphasizing the discretionary language of this 
rule, the court explained that it would leave open the question of 
whether a district court must determine its personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant before entering default judgment.  However, it recognized a 
split with its sister circuits on this issue.128 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 129. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 130. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 131. 
 126. Id. at 133. 
 127. Id. (quoting Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 (2d 
Cir. 2010)). 
 128. For cases where courts made a finding of personal jurisdiction mandatory before a court 
enters default judgment, see Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Sys. Pipe & Supply, 
Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir. 
1997).  Here, the Second Circuit cited to an earlier ruling where it did vacate a default judgment and 
remand to the trial court to determine whether the defendants had actually committed the acts which 
would have subjected them to the forum state’s long-arm statute.  Credit Lyonnais Sec. U.S.A., Inc. v. 
15
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The court then turned to an extensive discussion in which it found 
that the defendants had waived their personal jurisdiction defense, 
stating that “a district court should not raise personal jurisdiction sua 
sponte when a defendant has appeared and consented, voluntarily or not, 
to the jurisdiction of the court.”129  Although recognizing that forfeiture 
of personal jurisdiction generally occurs through failure to raise the 
defense in responsive pleadings, it explained that in some situations, a 
defendant may implicitly submit to the jurisdiction of the court 
involuntarily, based on conduct during the litigation.130  The court found 
that Mickalis Pawn and Adventure Outdoors had forfeited their 
jurisdictional defenses by announcing to the court that they would cease 
defending although default would likely follow.131  It rejected the 
defendants’ argument that the district court should not have entered 
default judgment without determining that there was enough evidence in 
the record to sustain a finding of personal jurisdiction by a 
preponderance of the evidence.132  
The court then addressed the defendants’ argument that the default 
judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Restating its 
conclusion that the defendants had waived their jurisdictional defenses 
by appearing and then withdrawing, the court explained that the 
defendants could no longer challenge the default judgment for voidness 
based on lack of personal jurisdiction.133  It explained: 
 
Alcantra, 183 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 1999).  In Credit Lyonnais, the court explained that a trial court may 
initially deny a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion “to the extent it attacks the plaintiff’s theory of 
jurisdiction without conducting inquiry into the disputed jurisdictional facts, eventually it must 
determine whether the defendant in fact subjected itself to the court’s jurisdiction.”  183 F.3d at 154.  
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the jurisdictional facts at an evidentiary hearing or at trial before 
default judgment can be entered.  The Mickalis court neither attempted to distinguish Credit Lyonnais 
from the facts in Mickalis, nor explain its conflicting rulings in both cases. 
 129. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 133 (quoting Sinoying, 619 F.3d at 213). 
 130. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 133.  The court gave examples of defendants’ conduct 
constituting forfeiture, including failing to actively litigate a personal jurisdiction defense until four 
years after initially raising it in its answer, or unsuccessfully raising a jurisdictional objection at the 
outset but later creating the impression that the defendant has abandoned the defense.  S  Hamilton v. 
Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 60–62 (2d Cir. 1999); Rice v. Nova Biomed. Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 914–
15 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 131. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 135. 
 132. Id. at 136.  As authority, defendants relied on D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95 
(2d Cir. 2006), where the defendants failed to answer the petition to confirm an arbitral award after 
removing the plaintiff’s petition to federal court.  The Second Circuit held that the district court was 
required to determine whether the plaintiff was actually entitled to the award it sought, regardless of the 
defendants’ failure to answer, explaining that “[w]hen a court has before it [an extensive evidentiary] 
record, rather than the allegations of one party found in complaints, the judgment the court enters should 
be based on the record.”  Id. at 109.  Here, the Second Circuit distinguishes D.H. Blair by arguing that 
that case involved a rare procedural posture brought up under the Federal Arbitration Act, and that 
Mickalis Pawn’s case “[did] not concern a scenario in which a court is presented with a complete 
evidentiary record from a prior proceeding.”  Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 136. 
 133. Id. at 138.  Judge Wesley’s concurrence highlights the importance of this finding of waiver.  
16
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By submitting to the jurisdiction of the district court to decide the 
question of personal jurisdiction—but then withdrawing from the 
proceedings, rather than litigating the case to final judgment—the 
defendants failed to preserve their jurisdictional defense for review on 
appeal . . . [a]nd because they failed to preserve that defense, they 
acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the district court, and the resulting 
judgment of that court is not void.134 
The court found that the defendants’ default was a “deliberate 
tactic.”135  It stated that it was “not without sympathy,” for the financial 
hardship imposed upon the defendants from being subjected to suit in 
New York, but declined to excuse what it believed to be a forfeiture of 
personal jurisdiction.136 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Mickalis Pawn Shop illustrates a post-answer default under a situation 
differing markedly from a “simple” default where a defendant fails 
entirely to answer the complaint.137  In light of the language of Rule 55, 
the history and policy objectives of the rule, and the comparatively low 
culpability of Mickalis Pawn in withdrawing from the litigation, the 
district court should have applied the Rule 55 analysis advanced by the 
Fifth Circuit in Bass and Solaroll and should have used its discretion to 
deny the City of New York’s motion for default judgment.   
Post-answer defaults are inconsistent with Rule 55’s plain language, 
history and policy rationales.  By recognizing a post-answer default and 
requiring the defendants here both to “plead” nd to “otherwise defend” 
the lawsuit to the very end, the Second Circuit—and other circuit courts 
 
Judge Wesley disagreed with the district court’s reasoning on the personal jurisdiction issue and 
suggested he would not have found personal jurisdiction but for the default.  See infra notes 158 to 160 
and accompanying text. 
 134. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 140. 
 135. Id.  The court also explained that its decision not to excuse the defendants’ forfeiture of 
personal jurisdiction was also based on preserving the policy rationales of the final judgment rule, 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”).  It argued that the defendants had attempted 
to “short-circuit the normal litigation process by withdrawing, inducing a default judgment to be entered 
against them, and then obtaining de facto interlocutory review over otherwise non-appealable 
decisions.”  Id. at. 141.  In the court’s opinion, this would undermine “the policy against piecemeal 
litigation.”  Id. (quoting Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 136. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 141–42.  The court vacated the injunctions, finding them to 
be vague and overbroad, and remanded the case to the district court for new injunctions. 
 137. In In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1205 (1996), the Fifth Circuit provided helpful terminology 
to distinguish between three types of defaults.  One is “simple default,” where the defendant fails to 
respond to the complaint.  Another is “post-answer” default, where the defendant answers the complaint 
but does not appear at trial.  The third type is the judgment nihil dicit, where the defendant has either 
entered a plea of a dilatory nature which fails to place the merits of the plaintiff’s case at issue, or the 
defendant has placed the merits at issue in its answer but later withdraws that answer. 
17
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applying the majority interpretation of Rule 55(a)—misread the plain 
language of the rule.  That rule finds a defendant in default for a “failure 
to plead or otherwise defend.”138  The minority interpretation of the 
phrase “otherwise defend,” as advanced by Bass, suggests a broad range 
of filings and motions a defendant can make in addition to or instead of 
pleading to the merits—including “attacks on service, motions to 
dismiss, or motions for better particulars.”139  When viewed in 
conjunction with the word or in Rule 55(a), the phrase “otherwise 
defend” should be interpreted as suggesting responsive pleadings or 
other actions to be taken by the defendant in response to the initial 
complaint that may take the place of pleading.  Thus, Rule 55(a)’s plain 
language does not demand that defendants both plead and efend the 
lawsuit to conclusion, as the Second Circuit seems to require.  Because 
the federal courts prefer to use the plain language of the statute to 
determine its meaning,140 the minority approach to interpreting Rule 
55(a) more accurately reads the word “or” to actually mean “or.”  In 
contrast, the majority approach incorrectly reads the word “or” to mean 
“and,” requiring defendants to file responsive pleadings and to litigate 
aggressively to the end.  Rule 55(a)’s plain language does not support 
such an interpretation. 
The minority view as advanced by Bass and Solaroll also has support 
from Charles A. Wright and Arthur Miller.141  They explain that the 
phrase “otherwise defend” refers to “challenges to such matters as 
service, venue, and the sufficiency of the prior pleading, any of which 
might prevent a default if pursued in the absence of a responsive 
pleading.”142  Wright and Miller agree with Solaroll that “a defendant 
who has participated throughout the pretrial process and has filed a 
responsive pleading, placing the case at issue, has not conceded 
liability.” 143  In such a situation, the plaintiff must present evidence 
supporting liability, in addition to damages, and can win a favorable 
 
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 55 (emphasis added). 
 139. Bass v. Hoaglund, 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949). 
 140. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (explaining that where the 
“words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes . . . are sufficient in and of 
themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation . . . a court should follow their plain meaning,” 
unless that meaning would lead to absurd or futile results). 
 141. WRIGHT &  M ILLER, supra note 17, § 2682.  Wright (1927–2000) held the Charles Alan 
Wright Chair in Federal Courts at the University of Texas.  Miller (1934–) is a University Professor at 
New York University, formerly Bruce Bromley Professor of Law at Harvard University. 
 142. WRIGHT &  MILLER, supra note 17, § 2682.  Moore’s Federal Practice is also in agreement 
with this rule, stating that “a party precludes default by ‘pleading’ in response to a claim within the time 
allowed.” 10-55 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 55.11(2)(a)(i) (2011).  “Responsive pleadings” 
are those listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 7, which include an answer to the complaint, an answer to a 
counterclaim, an answer to a crossclaim, and a third-party answer to a third-party complaint.  Id. 
 143. WRIGHT &  M ILLER, supra note 17, § 2682. 
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judgment only “if the evidence supports it.”144  Although a defendant 
cannot avoid default simply by appearing, “if defendant appears and 
indicates a desire to contest the action, the court can exercise its 
discretion and refuse to enter a default.”145 
The meaning of “plead or otherwise defend” is also informed by the 
history of Rule 55.  The rule’s text is based substantially on Rules 18 
and 19 of the Equity Rules of 1912, governing decrees pro confesso.146  
Those decrees were granted for failure to appear within the required 
time, or once having appeared, failure to “plead, demur, or answer the 
bill within the time limited for that purpose; or if [the defendant] fail[ed] 
to answer after a former plea, demurrer or answer is overruled or 
declared insufficient.”147  Thus, the decree pro confesso was not 
available to the plaintiff if the defendant pleaded, demurred or answered 
within the required timeframe, in which case the litigation proceeded ex 
parte.148  Thus, the emphasis of the Equity Rules was speedy disposition 
 
 144. Id.  The requirement that the plaintiff prove its case in an ex parte proceeding absent a 
finding of bad faith default has its roots in English common law.  If a defendant failed to appear the day 
of trial, “the plaintiff, notwithstanding the contumancy of the defendant, only obtained judgment in 
accordance with the truth of the case as established by an ex parte examination.”  Thompson v. Wooster, 
114 U.S. 104, 110 (1885).  This was a change from earlier common law, where failure to appear on the 
day of trial was deemed a “confession of the action,” allowing the plaintiff to recover the amount 
specified in the complaint, regardless of whether it was reasonable.  See WRIGHT &  MILLER, supra note 
17, § 2681. 
 145. WRIGHT &  M ILLER, supra note 17, § 2682 (emphasis added).  This standard, requiring 
merely an intent to contest the action, is arguably an even lower standard than that found in Bass and 
Solaroll.  However, it appears to be consistent with the 2007 amendments to Rule 55, which removed 
the phrase “as provided by these rules” after “failed to plead or otherwise defend.”  The Advisory 
Committee explains that this change was enacted in response to courts’ erroneous interpretations 
requiring the defendant to perform an act linked to some other Federal Rule.  The Committee explains, 
“Acts that show an intent to defend have frequently prevented a default even though not connected to 
any particular rule.”  FED. R. CIV . P. 55 Advisory Committee Notes, 2007 Amendments.  In H.F. 
Livermore Corp., the D.C. Circuit also suggested that the defendant’s intent to defend the suit is the 
basis for Rule 55(b)’s notice requirements, intended to “protect those parties who, although delaying in 
a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated to the 
moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit.”  432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  For an 
application of this principle, see Bravado Int’l Grp. Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Ninna, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 
177 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing a responsive pleading filed by pro se defendant in trademark 
infringement litigation that was held to be sufficient to avoid default, despite not meeting the 
requirements of a responsive pleading, because the document clearly indicated the defendant’s intent to 
deny specific allegations in the complaint). 
 146. WRIGHT &  M ILLER, supra note 17, § 2681. 
 147. Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 112 (1885). 
 148. FEDERAL EQUITY RULES OF 1912 154–57.  Equity Rule 16 states, in relevant part: “It shall be 
the duty of the defendant, [unless a time extension has been granted], to file his answer or other defense 
to the bill in the clerk’s office . . . in default thereof, the plaintiff may, at his election, take an order as of 
course that the bill be taken pro confesso; and thereupon the cause shall be proceeded in ex parte” 
(emphasis added).  The Equity Rules, perhaps in accordance with equity’s emphasis on fairness, 
provided liberal means by which defaulting defendants could redeem themselves; Rule 17, for example, 
allows the court to “set aside [the bill pro confesso], or enlarge the time for filing the answer, upon 
cause shown upon motion and affidavit,” thereby allowing a defendant in default additional time to 
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of the claim; as long as a defendant’s conduct did not prevent the 
litigation from moving forward, with or without the defendant’s 
appearance, the Rules militated against using a bill or decree pro 
confesso to provide an automatic victory to the plaintiff.  
A court’s decision to grant default judgment after entry of default is 
highly discretionary, and thus the district court in Mickalis Pawn Shop 
was not required to do so.  Because of the significant merit issues 
collateral to the public nuisance claim—including whether the City’s 
claim was preempted by the PLCAA and whether the defendants’ 
conduct was covered by New York’s long-arm statute (an issue of first 
impression)—the district court should have required the City to prove its 
case on the merits.  This is consistent with the federal courts’ general 
policy preferring to resolve cases on the merits, especially when there is 
doubt over whether a default should be entered.149 
A. Mickalis Pawn Should Not Have Been Found in Default 
Prejudice to the non-defaulting party is a major factor the federal 
courts consider in determining whether a default judgment is an 
appropriate sanction.150  Rule 55’s objectives are to prevent a dilatory 
defendant from impeding a speedy disposition of the plaintiff’s claims, 
and to keep cases moving forward.151  Post-answer defaults implicate 
these objectives much less strongly than “simple” defaults.  In a simple 
default situation, the case cannot move forward until the defendant files 
an answer.  Therefore, default is an appropriate remedy to the potential 
problem of a defendant’s continuous refusal to file an answer, whereby a 
defendant could make itself judgment-proof by simply refusing to 
acknowledge the existence of a lawsuit. 
However, after an answer has been filed and the lawsuit has been set 
in motion, the risks of prejudice to the plaintiff caused by delay are less 
apparent.  In Mickalis Pawn Shop, the  case had already been through 
discovery and was scheduled for trial.  With the defendants having fully 
participated in discovery and pretrial conferences, there was nothing left 
 
begin or resume active participation in the litigation.  Similarly, Rule 17 “allowed for a setting aside of 
the decree pro confesso provided that the defendant “shall undertake to file his answer within such time 
as the court shall direct, and submit to such other terms as the court shall direct, for the purpose of 
speeding the cause.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 149. WRIGHT &  M ILLER, supra note 17, § 2682; see also Davis v. Parkhill-Goode, 302 F.2d 489, 
495 (5th Cir. 1962) (“Where there are no intervening equities any doubt should, as a general 
proposition, be resolved in favor . . . of securing a trial upon the merits.”). 
 150. See S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Poulis v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) (enumerating the factors for considering the 
appropriateness of default judgment, including “prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet 
scheduling orders and respond to discovery”). 
 151. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 232 (2011). 
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to prevent the City from fully presenting the merits of its case to the 
court ex parte.152  Mickalis Pawn and Adventure Outdoors’s withdrawal 
just before trial was the practical equivalent of making an appearance at 
trial but actually doing nothing to put on a defense.  Unlike a simple 
default situation, the City of New York was not disadvantaged or 
prevented from obtaining its requested relief by the defendants’ 
withdrawal.  If anything, the City would have been advantaged by the 
defendants’ refusal to participate actively in a trial—in an ex parte trial, 
the City’s factual claims would not have been rebutted, and the lack of a 
defense would have possibly shortened the length of the trial and 
reduced expenses.  Because the City was not materially disadvantaged 
by the defendants’ refusal to participate, an entry of default and 
subsequent default judgment were not needed to keep the case moving 
forward to conclusion.  
Courts considering default judgment also weigh the culpability of the 
defendant, and whether the defendant has acted in bad faith.153  Mickalis 
Pawn’s conduct in this case does not exhibit the same level of 
culpability displayed by other post-answer default defendants.  In those 
cases cited by Mickalis Pawn Shop as examples of the majority rule, the 
defendants’ failures to respond to discovery, attend pretrial conferences, 
file pretrial memoranda, provide valid mailing addresses for process 
agents, or obtain substitute counsel, were not justified by anything other 
than a bad faith motive to delay proceedings.  In contrast, Mickalis 
Pawn’s withdrawal from the suit was based primarily on Mr. Mickalis’s 
desire to devote his limited remaining financial resources to the defense 
of his pending criminal charges in South Carolina.  It is not unbelievable 
to think that a small business, forced to litigate for almost two years in a 
distant forum, would eventually find itself with dwindling financial 
resources, and it is not impossible to imagine this situation arising again.  
One is thus hard-pressed to characterize Mickalis Pawn’s actions as 
“willful violations of court rules, contumacious conduct or intentional 
delays,” justifying the severe sanction of default judgment.154 
Finally, courts also consider whether the defendant has engaged in “a 
history of dilatoriness.”155  The defendants here did not cause delay to 
any proceedings—in fact, the court’s opinion suggests that the 
defendants consistently filed timely motions to dismiss and complied 
with all discovery requests.  In addition, because discovery had been 
completed and the case was about to go to trial, the defendant’s 
 
 152. Hypothetically, had the defendants not cooperated in discovery, default judgment under Rule 
37(b)(2)(A)(vi) would have been a more appropriate sanction than under Rule 55. 
 153. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. 
 154. Fingerhut Corp. v. Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 155. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. 
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withdrawal did not create a possibility of delay, as the trial could have 
easily proceeded ex parte.  Therefore, there was no basis for finding a 
history of dilatory tactics on the part of the defendants that would have 
justified a default judgment.  
B. The City’s Success in an Ex Parte Hearing Would Not Have Been a 
Foregone Conclusion. 
Where a defendant has not appeared (or has withdrawn from trial), 
but has otherwise not been found in default, the plaintiff is not absolved 
of its burden of proof.  Instead, the plaintiff must continue with its case 
and prove its claim on the merits, “just as if the defendant had been 
present at trial,” before receiving a favorable judgment.156  Requiring the 
plaintiff to prove its case on the merits under the same burden of proof 
that would be required of it at trial is not merely an academic exercise in 
the absence of the defendant.  Although it would be admittedly easier 
for a plaintiff to prove its case in an ex parte hearing without an active 
adversary to rebut its factual arguments, the difference between the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof in an ex parte hearing and the burden of proof 
needed to win a default judgment is substantial.  Furthermore, “[t]he 
requirement that a party whose non-defaulting opponent fails to appear 
for trial must prove his case even in the absence of the opposing party 
reflects the basic nature of the burden of proof requirements in our trial 
system.”157 
Under the majority approach, a plaintiff with a case weak on the 
merits can obtain a favorable judgment while meeting a minimal burden.  
As long as the plaintiff’s case is well-pleaded enough to avoid a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal, the plaintiff can win the damages specified in the 
complaint without regard to the merits or strengths of the case.  Rule 
55(b) does not demand a factual hearing to determine the merits; rather, 
judges may exercise wide discretion in the hearings they hold.  As the 
cases from the majority approach suggest, a hearing to determine the 
exact amount of damages may be held, but is not required.  
Under the minority approach, plaintiffs do not win so easily.  A 
defendant who has responded to the complaint has forced the plaintiff to 
 
 156. 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 263 (2011) (“The plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to 
meet his or her burden of proof as if at trial.”). 
 157. Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Ass’n., 502 N.E.2d 599, 602 
(Ohio 1986).  Adopting the Bass interpretation, the Ohio Supreme Court explained: “The sole 
responsibility of a defendant who has effectively contested the claimant’s allegations by pleading is to 
refute the claimant’s case after the latter has established a prima facie case by proper evidence.  If the 
plaintiff cannot make out such a case, the defendant need not present any vidence at trial.  Conversely, 
once a case is at issue, it is improper for a court to enter judgment against a defendant without requiring 
proof of the plaintiff’s claim.”  Id. 
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win on the merits, with the same preponderance of the evidence burden 
of proof as the plaintiff would have at trial.  Although proving a case on 
the merits is arguably much easier without active participation from a 
defendant, the difference between the minimal burden of proof under the 
majority and minority approaches is substantial. 
In Mickalis Pawn Shop, a victory on the merits for the City was not a 
foregone conclusion, especially regarding the personal jurisdiction issue.  
Judge Wesley’s concurrence contains a vehement rebuke of the district 
court’s personal jurisdiction analysis and concludes that the lower court 
incorrectly applied New York’s long-arm statute to find that Mickalis 
Pawn and Adventure Outdoors were subject to personal jurisdiction in 
New York.158  In examining the “quality and nature” of the defendants’ 
conduct, Judge Wesley determined that the defendants did not “transact 
any business within the state or contract[ ] . . . to supply goods . . . in the 
state,” or commit any tortious act within the state; nor did they conduct 
or solicit any business in New York or “engage[ ] in any other persistent 
course of conduct or derive[ ] substantial revenue from goods 
used . . . in the state.”159  Nor was there any evidence to suggest that the 
defendants knew or should have known of the consequences of their 
conduct while deriving substantial revenue from interstate or 
international commerce.160  Ultimately, Judge Wesley concluded that the 
defendants nonetheless waived the personal jurisdiction defense through 
pre-trial default.161  However, this shows that had Mickalis Pawn and 
Adventure Outdoors not been held in default, the issue may have been 
decided differently at trial or reversed on appeal.  Furthermore, whether 
the New York long-arm statute could be applied in public-nuisance suits 
against nonresident firearms dealers was an issue of first impression, 
which suggests that the case could have benefitted substantially from the 
additional fact-finding that would probably have occurred at an ex parte
 
 158. City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 147 (2d Cir. 2011) (Wesley, 
J., concurring). 
 159. Id. at 148–49 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2008)).  Judge Wesley stated, 
“Here, it is indisputable that defendants’ businesses are of a local character” and thus specifically 
outside the reach of the New York long-arm statute. Id. 
 160. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 148; see also Asahi Metal Indus. v. California, 480 U.S. 
102, 112 (1987) (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the 
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an 
act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).  Judge Wesley particularly took exception to the 
District Court’s conclusion that the defendants’ “cumulative parallel conduct” was a proper basis for 
finding personal jurisdiction.  According to Judge Wesley’s analysis, this standard would establish 
jurisdiction by showing that the defendants new that many others were engaged in “parallel” conduct, 
even if each individual defendant’s conduct would be insufficient by itself to establish personal 
jurisdiction.  Judge Wesley argued that neither the Second Circuit nor the New York Court of Appeals 
had ever interpreted New York’s long arm statute to allow for personal jurisdiction based on the 
combined conduct of multiple defendants.  Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 149. 
 161. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 152. 
23
Kendall: Defendants’ Burdens Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55: Post-Answer Default
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1102 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
hearing, but for the default.162  Because the City of New York was 
required at the pleading stage to show only a “substantial likelihood that 
all the elements of jurisdiction could be established at trial,”163 the City 
was absolved from meeting its burden of conclusively proving that all 
the elements of the long-arm statute had been met by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mickalis Pawn Shop exemplifies an atypical default judgment 
situation where the defendants litigated vigorously throughout the 
pretrial process before withdrawing in good faith.  Under these 
circumstances, the defendants displayed no intent to obstruct or delay 
the proceedings.  Following the minority rule and requiring the City of 
New York to proceed to prove its claim on the merits in an ex parte 
hearing by a preponderance of the evidence would not have caused 
delay or prejudice.  The policy rationales of Rule 55—avoiding delay 
and ensuring speedy disposition of claims—were not implicated by the 
facts of this case. 
Furthermore, in light of the federal courts’ interest in deciding cases 
on the merits, the district court should have exercised its discretion to 
require the City to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendants’ conduct was covered by the New York long-arm statute, 
especially because this was an issue of first impression.  By finding that 
the defendants had waived their jurisdictional defenses by defaulting, 
the Second Circuit compounded the district court’s erroneous 
application of Rule 55 and avoided serious analysis of a meritorious 
defense by which the defendants could have possibly prevailed at trial or 
on appeal. 
Mickalis Pawn Shop therefore illustrates the shortcomings of the 
majority interpretation of Rule 55.  By not recognizing a post-answer 
default, the minority rule is more consistent with the plain language, 
history and policy objectives of Rule 55, as well as with the federal 
courts’ preference for resolving cases on the merits.  Federal courts must 
consider these factors as they continue to refine Rule 55’s interpretation 
and apply it to situations where, as in Mickalis Pawn Shop, a defendant 
withdraws from litigation in good faith after responding to the 
complaint.  Finally, the federal courts must consider how the uncertainty 
created by the circuit split affects defendants, and work towards 
achieving more uniformity in the rule’s interpretation and application. 
 
 162. City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 163. Id. 
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